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DISCUSSION KICK-OFF
Victor’s Justice in 
Disguise?
UN Security Council Referrals and the International 
Criminal Court
The UN Security Council has the power to refer situations to 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) against the will of the 
territorial state, even if that state is not a party to the ICC. 
The Council has done so for the first time in 2005 in the case 
of the atrocities committed in the brutal civil war in Darfur, 
Sudan. That referral resulted inter alia in two open arrest 
warrants issued against Sudan’s sitting President, Omar Al-
Bashir (on the question of Al-Bashir’s immunity see e.g. here, 
here and here). The second referral was directed at the 
atrocities committed in Libya in 2011, but has gone nowhere 
so far.

Influence of Powerful States
While these referrals were celebrated as important steps 
towards ending impunity for international crimes, it is 
important to recognize that the referral mechanism ensures 
the influence of powerful states. In practice, the permanent 
members of the Security Council (“P5,” including those that 
are not members of the ICC, namely China, Russia and the 
U.S.) are given the power to veto or otherwise influence any 
referral. In other words, the referral power gives the 
permanent members of the Security Council the power to 
refer situations to the ICC without themselves being 
effectively subjected to its jurisdiction. Also, the Council is 
under no obligation to refer a situation in which crimes 
under the statute appear to be committed. And while the ICC 
claims to carry out its work in the name of the ‘international 
community’ (on this see here), the Court’s selective 
geography of intervention (Libya but not Syria or North 
Korea) has offered support for its critics that prosecuting 
international crimes is an inherently political undertaking 
(see on this here).
Victor’s Justice without Victors?
With all this in mind, it is difficult to see how that situation is 
effectively different from the historical practice of victor’s 
justice. The Council continues a practice of double standards. 
Major powers represented in the Council may effectively 
tailor the referrals to secure their interests, as the U.S. has 
done in practice in the referrals of Darfur and Libya, 
explicitly excluding the ICC’s jurisdiction over certain 
categories of nationals of non-States Parties (see operative 
paragraph 6 of the referrals to that effect and the discussions 
here and here). The only major difference appears to be that 
the major powers represented in the Council do not have to 
win a war to impose victor’s justice.
This makes sense when it is understood that “law 
consolidates winnings, translating victory into right” (David 
Kennedy, A World of Struggle 11). Viewed in that light, 
Kennedy argues, the UN Security Council was established to 
institutionalize the outcome of the Second World War and 
perpetuate the P5’s victory (ibid., 259). It follows that by 
giving the Council the power to bring situations under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, international law is providing the legal 
means to impose victor’s justice in the name of what is 
commonly called the “international community.” Through 
law, not all wars need to be fought to be won (ibid., 259). The 
Security Council referral makes this legally possible. This also 
means that, in a sense, the ICC contributes to the 
legitimization and reproduction of victor’s justice.
Such victor’s justice in disguise is, of course, not new. As 
Thrasymachus already says in Plato’s Republic, “everywhere 
justice is the same thing, the advantage of the stronger.” Yet, 
the ideal of a permanent international criminal court was 
conceived as a departure from such a double standard. Its 
very raison d’être lies in the fact that a permanent 
international institution is the only way to depart from such 
practice. And yet, the Security Council referral as included in 
the Rome Statute defeats this ideal. This is not acceptable. As 
Hans Kelsen wrote in 1944 in Peace through Law:
“[i]t is not compatible with the idea of international justice 
that only the vanquished States should be obliged to 
surrender their subjects to the jurisdiction of international 
tribunal for the punishment of war crimes. The victorious 
States, too, should be willing to transfer jurisdiction over 
their own subjects who have offended the laws of warfare to 
the same independent and impartial international tribunal. 
Only if the victors submit themselves to the same law which 
they wish to impose upon the vanquished States will the idea 
of international justice be preserved.” (pp. 114-115)
To be sure, the Security Council refers situations to the ICC 
under its mandate to secure international peace and security 
(as it has done when establishing the ICTY and ICTR, which 
has also been accused of victor’s justice, see, eg. here). But it 
would be difficult to argue that victor’s justice is necessary 
for the maintenance of peace and security (on the problem of 
the collision of the regimes of the Security Council and the 
ICC see here).
So what?
Why does all this even matter? Of course, we do not live in an 
ideal world and international law generally is not ideal – but 
such complacency underestimates the role of legal expertise 
in shaping exactly that non-ideal world and non-ideal 
international law we lament. David Kennedy’s book makes 
one thing clear: It is our expertise that shapes the world. 
Thus, we should not excuse ourselves from the responsibility 
for the outcomes of our expertise: If we accept the world as 
it is, we are complicit in its inequalities and injustices.
Where does this leave us as experts? In the words of Donna 
Haraway, the responsibility of scholars lies in producing 
“knowledge potent for constructing worlds less organized by 
axes of domination.” (Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The 
Reinvention of Nature 192)
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